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Each function-based department inside a company is individually optimized in a 
way most favorable to its own department, but from the standpoint of the entire 
company, each department is not necessarily behaving in the best interest of the entire 
company. That is, the manager of each function-based department possesses a biased 
preference for his or her own department.   
The manager of each function-based department holds private information about 
his or her respective department's fields of expertise and technological advances. Given 
this understanding, it may be advisable for the company's headquarters to delegate 
decision-making authority to the managers of these individual departments. However, 
if decision-making authority is delegated to individual departments or to the managers 
representing the interests of each of those departments, those departments may pursue 
their own interests even at the expense of the company's interests as a whole.   
By contract, the product manager does not have private information but is thinking 
about the new product under development as a whole and thus does not have a biased 
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preference. The question then, is, what kind of governance structure will serve as the 
optimal solution? When each manager possesses a biased preference for his or her own 
department, it is important to consider the impact that the allocation of formal authority 
and the information flow within the organizational hierarchy has on the organizational 
capacity for innovation. 
This theme is developed and illustrated, using the case of  development of 
Toyota's "Prius". 
In the case of Toyota Motor, too, this point has been an important issue for a long 
time when planning its development organization structure. The development of the 
world's first mass-produced hybrid vehicle, the Prius by Toyota is one of the most 
successful examples of innovative product development in recent years. However, it 
has been hardly studied as to how such architectural innovation was possible within the 
largest organization in Japan. This paper argues at length the development process of 
the Prius and transfiguration of Toyota's development organization structure from the 
viewpoint of organizational economics framework. Development of the first Prius 
model by Toyota set the stage for adoption of a new development organization 
structure : the term-limited implementation of the new "Big Room" approach, which 
did bring about lasting changes to Toyota's organizational framework for vehicle 
development. It will be noted that concept design, or in other words interdepartmental 
coordination, was more important in the initial phase of development (the first six 
months), and thus, the "Big Room" structure was the development organization 
structure of choice for implementation. By contrast, after the initial six months, work 
on the concept design of the product development had been almost completed and 
interdepartmental coordination had become less important to the company compared 
with advances in the technologies for the engine and other component systems. For that 
reason, the development organization was transitioned to a more decentralized structure 
of governance, the conventional “chief engineer” structure.  The new development 
organization is a kind of hybrid organization, which lies between "centralization" and 
"decentralization". 
Furthermore, we touched upon the point that delay is costly in decision problems 
because it increases the lag upon which decisions are based, and evaluated the new   3 
development organization structure from that viewpoint, too. 
The arguments made in this paper will presumably be of value as generalized 





It is rather difficult for large established organizations to register commercial 
success with the development of innovative products. However, in recent years there has 
been one example of this type of success, albeit rare even on the international level. That 
example is the development of the Prius hybrid car by Toyota Motor Corp. The story of 
this Prius development has been drawing much attention, not only within Japan but also 
internationally, as one of the most successful examples of innovative  product 
development in recent years (Iemura,1999 ; Ikari,1999 ; Itazaki,1999 ; Liker,2004; 
Egawa,Reinhardt and Yao, 2006 ; Tsukamoto,2006). However, there are few theses or 
studies that analyzed this story from the standpoint of rationality of the development 
process or the development organization structure.   
   
  Toyota is the largest corporation in Japan. Nonetheless, given that the Prius was 
the world's first mass-produced hybrid car, it stands out as an example of highly 
innovative product development in a short period of time. On top of that, it was an 
example of a development accomplishment that has had an enormous impact on 
business structure not only at Toyota itself, but throughout the entire global automobile 
industry. In effect, the Prius has to a significant extent become a powerful 
counterexample to the notion that architectural  innovative product development is 
beyond the ability of large-scale established corporations. An even more intriguing 
feature of this particular development case is that it was spearheaded by Toyota, which 
pioneered the “chief engineer” model, an established model of governance structure that 
has been successfully implemented by the automotive industry up to now. Toyota had 
never traditionally been reputed to be an innovative company. The company had rather 
been criticized for multiplying  fairly similar types of cars. Toyota's customers, if   4 
anything, belonged to the high age group, and Toyota did not have a very strong appeal 
to the young generation. Although Carolla of Toyota has been one of the best selling 
cars, the main reason for customers' choice of Carolla has been the reasonableness of its 
price (Egawa,Reinhardt and Yao, 2006).   
 
 
Identifying organizational structures that are successful in the pursuit of innovative 
product development may be one of the most significant themes that researchers in 
organization theory have addressed in recent years. Generating new ideas alone is not 
enough to ensure the commercial success of an undertaking in product development.   
Although internal ventures (firm within a firm) and skunkworks may excel at 
generating new ideas, there is a limit to the technologies and skills of each of the 
specialized sectors forming their core, like engine. Furthermore, they may face resource 
constraints in terms of their manufacturing and marketing capacity and other functions 
essential for commercial success. These are reasons why huge success in the arena of 
product development is not that easy to achieve. On the other hand, while an 
organization of sufficiently large scale typically will have an abundance of the functions 
essential for commercial success, the internal organizations of a company and top 
management are all separated by barriers that slow decision-making and 
communications, foster internal biases, and make it difficult for the company in its 
entirety to register desirable accomplishments (Bresnahan, Greenstein, and Henderson, 
2007). Even at companies that are not very large, problems of this kind become 
common once the company has attained a certain level of corporate scale (Foss, 2003).   
In the final analysis, the development organization will always face a trade-off 
between  interdepartmental  communication quality and decision quality of 
function-based departments. Accordingly, the way in which the organization deals with 
its operational setting and controls this trade-off will largely determine whether its 
development work is successful or not. 
 
In effect, it amounted to a reasonably convincing refutation of the notion that the 
creative development of bread-and-butter product lines is difficult for large corporations   5 
to accomplish. Especially, established firms often have a surprising degree of difficulty 
in adapting to “architectural innovation” because much of what the firm knows is useful 
and needs to be applied in the new product, but some of what it knows is not only not 
useful but may actually handicap the firm
1
 
.   
The development of a jet aircraft can be cited as a representative example of 
architectural innovation”The jet engine initially appeared to have important but 
straightforward implications for airframe technology. Established firms in the industry 
understood that they would need to develop jet engine expertise but failed to understand 
the ways in which its introduction would change the interactions between the engine and 
the rest of the plane in complex and subtle ways.”(Henderson and Clark,1990,    p17)     
There seems to be a similar aspect in the development of the hybrid car as in the 
development of the jet aircraft, as both are thought to have a strong tinge of architectural 
innovation. This is because, although the development of the hybrid car is conducted 
based on technologies for each component for conventional gasoline-powered cars (In 
fact, there was even an idea within Toyota of loading hybrid engines on Camry, an 
existing gasoline-powered car, at the initial stage of development of the hybrid car.), 
there are significant differences in interactions among various components. The 
following is an example of such differences in interactions among components.   
The hybrid technology is a technology to combine good features of gasoline 
engines and those of electric motors.. Electric Motors are efficient when accelerating 
rapidly. In contrast, gasoline-powered engines are not efficient when accelerating but 
become efficient once they reach a certain level of rotation. Consequently, the 
gasoline-powered engine sometimes stops by itself while a vehicle is running. And then, 
when the engine starts again by itself, it trembles just naturally. However, since the 
trembling may occur at unexpected timing to the driver, it could give a far more 
uncomfortable, uneasy feeling to the driver even if the degree of the trembling is the 
same as that you get when the driver starts engine of a conventional gasoline-powered 
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engine car himself. How to solve this problem?  If you follow the way of thinking 
about the development of conventional types of cars, you will never be able to find a 
solution to this problem, because the driver gets a hateful feeling against the trembling 
because the engine starts moving at unexpected timing to him, despite the fact that the 
same degree of trembling is occurring as before. Even if we claim that this is a problem 
to be solved by the engine department, it may not be solved at the level of the engine 
department. Thus, in this case, Uchiyamada, who assumed the position of chief engineer 
for the development of the first Prius model, appointed a specialist on trembling studies 
as the leader of the task team to tackle this problem and specialists in engines as staff 
members to support him, unlike the conventional way of doing, and furthermore added 
specialists in control technology to the staff. And furthermore he told the specialist on 
trembling, "(Even if this is a matter of engines,) you should be the leader and lead 
specialists in engines and people in the vehicle testing department." 
 
Accordingly, the most intriguing point about this development of the Prius was the 
fact that it had been driven by the innovations not of some new entrant in the industry, 
but of Toyota itself, an automaker with an established business model for success in the 
arena of product development. 
 
In pursuing this innovative undertaking in product development, what limits did 
the traditional development organization at Toyota confront? What new frameworks did 
that organization adopt in the process of surmounting those limits, and what was the 
justification for their adoption? Finally, why did these new frameworks thereafter have a 
permanent influence on the structure of Toyota's development organization? Finally, we 
seek to determine how the allocation of formal authority within the hierarchy of the 
development organization influences the organization's capacity for innovation. In this 
paper, these questions are addressed from an organizational economics-based 
perspective with close attention to the factual details. Enlisting an organizational 
economics perspective for a comparative analysis of the organization prior to, during, 
and after the Prius development project, the arguments made in this paper will 
presumably be of value as generalized recommendations for the shape of the   7 
development organization within large established corporations. 
 
2.   Development process of the first Prius model  and changes in 
development organization 
 
(1) The Biginning of Hybrid Car Development 
 
Toyota's initial foray into hybrid car development began with its "G21 Project" 
(Global 21 Project). The impetus for the G21 Project came around 1990 when Eiji 
Toyoda, then Chairman at Toyota, began insisting that with the end of the 20th century 
now approaching, the time had come for the company to begin seriously thinking about 
the types of car models it should offer the world market in the new century just ahead. 
However, because everyone at Toyota was busy with other things, no one immediately 
came forward to accept this challenge. Nonetheless, Toyoda continued to reiterate his 
plea over the next several years. Eventually, Yoshiro Kinbara, Vice President in charge 
of development was no longer able to ignore this and finally suggested forming a team 
for the purpose. The project thus took form as a study group in September 1993. At that 
stage, all members of this study group belonged at the same time to other departments 
where they were performing their main tasks, and about 30 people participated to the 
study group. As the study proceeded, it generated considerable interest, leading to the 
recommendation that a full-time specialist be assigned. The specialist role was assigned 
to Takeshi Uchiyamada in January 1994. Considering that the first Prius model was to 
enter mass production and go on the market at the end of 1997, the intervening 
development phase was surprisingly short, lasting only around four years. However, 
developing a hybrid car model was never the objective of the G21 Project at its outset. 
In fact, the project had two goals. One was to explore what a 21st-century car should be 
like. The other was to try a new approach to car development that changed certain 
aspects of the development methodology as then applied. Uchiyamada reportedly was 
given only these extremely ambiguous instructions and then ordered to work out the   8 




The G21 Project had been assigned the mission of exploring what cars should be 
like in the 21st century. Initially, the project team took on that theme with the goal of 
finding solutions to at least one of the problems likely to confront the 21st century's 
car-based society. However, in doing so, the team was also interested --at a minimum-- 
in maintaining, or even improving, the fun and conveniences that cars had provided 
society over the preceding century. Finally, as an outcome of study concerned with 
issues that the car-based society of the next century would absolutely have to overcome, 
the team ultimately focused on the issues of resource use and  environmental 
degradation, and crash safety. At that time, crash safety was already considered to be a 
serious challenge within Toyota and was something the company was working hard to 
address. The project team felt that the company could make progress toward improving 
the crash safety of its vehicle lines even without the active involvement of the team. 
Environmental problems, however, were not yet being openly addressed and some even 
argued that investment in environmental measures would not lead to profits for the 
company. Nonetheless this was an issue that would have to be confronted in the next 
century. Given that understanding and the potential for new oil shocks in the years 
ahead, the project team came up with a concept that would be one answer to these 
environmental issues. 
 
When the company's top echelon of executives had the concept explained to them, 
they accepted it with virtually no resistance and then ordered the team to explore ways 
of translating the concept into a commercial product. Around the summer of 1994, the 
G21 project team drew up a plan for one of the more challenging objectives at that time: 
                                                            
2  In the background of Eiji Toyoda's insistence  to initiate the Project, there seems to have been the following 
economic environment. At that time, due to the appreciation of yen in the foreign currency exchange market, there 
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money-consuming new projects. However, if such instructions are given, people cannot have dreams as engineers. 
Under such circumstances, a proposal to contrive a new type of car based on a totally new concept by utilizing every 
technology in hand was coined by Kiichi Inoue, General Manager of Merchandise Planning Department, who 
perceived Toyoda's intention and brought the Project to Yoshiro Kinbara, Vice President. (Statement of Kinbara, in 
Uchiyamada, 2003)   9 
achieving a 1.5-fold improvement in fuel efficiency. That goal had been set so high that 
if Toyota achieved it, its rivals probably would not be able to catch up for some time to 
come. The team came up with a system that would be profitable even if replacing a car 
model already in production. As Uchiyamada recalls, "We were quite confident." In fact, 
the plan was conditioned on utilizing a conventional gasoline-powered model rather 
than a hybrid vehicle. 
Namely, at that stage, Uchiyamada's intention was to achieve a 1.5-fold 
improvement in fuel efficiency, by combining a 1.5 liter direct-injection engine with a 
small combustion chamber and an automatic transmission based on high-efficiency 
manual transmission. His superior Kinbara, too, said, "When I was Vice President, I had 
never a thought about hybrid vehicles. I made a proposal to improve the fuel efficiency 
by 50 % and I understood that I was instructed to realize it.  When I was asked about 
the type of the engine, I responded that it would be based on gasoline direct injection." 
(Statement of Kinbara, in Uchiyamada, 2003) 
 
However, two of Toyota's management executives responsible for technical affairs, 
Akihiro Wada, who assumed the post of Vice President replacing Kinbara, and 
Masanao Shiomi, Managing Director, insisted that if the company were going to go 
through with these plans, then achieving a fuel efficiency boost of 1.5-fold would not be 
impressive enough for a 21st-century car. Uchiyamada recounts: "As engineers, this may 
sound like a gut-level comment, but personally it wasn't clear to me why a two-fold gain 
was considered adequate in the first place [laughing]. It's simply this. While a 1.5-fold 
gain in fuel efficiency was something most engineers would consider impressive, a 
two-fold gain was something anyone would have thought impressive. Certainly the 
average car customer would have thought so. That's why we have to achieve the higher 
goal." As engineers, Wada and Shiomi knew a two-fold gain in fuel efficiency would be 
difficult if not outright impossible to achieve with a conventional gasoline-powered car, 
and were fully aware this meant developing a hybrid vehicle. Both men consistently 
insisted that a hybrid vehicle should be the goal for a mass-produced 21st-century car 
model and asserted that if that step were taken, it would be clearly understood by the 
consuming public to represent a clean shift away from conventional car models and   10 
technologies.   
In fact, Shiomi was at that time leading the R&D on hybrid engines within Toyota, 
in the capacity something like its sponsor. This very person Shiomi, who is the number 
one promoter of the hybrid engine in Toyota, told Wada about the hybrid engine, and 
Wada as Vice President in charge made a judgment that it should be the hybrid that 
could give a strong impression to the world.     
   
However, Uchiyamada was resistant to that idea for some time, countering with 
two arguments: first, that hybrid engines were still in the R&D stage and not yet ready to 
put on the market as viable products, and second, that as project leader, he had to ensure 
that the project turned a profit but if hybrid technology were enlisted, the project would 
become too costly to be profitable. Ultimately, though, he was confronted by Wada, 
who said, "Look, if you don't want to go through with this, then quit if you like. 
However, we will get someone else to do it because it is something that has to be done." 
Uchiyamada recalls: "When the situation was put to me in that way, I began to feel I 
would have regrets if, having come this far, I couldn't be in charge of the development 
stage of commercial production." The decision was thus made to aim for the goal of a 
two-fold increase in fuel efficiency (with a hybrid car) and on that understanding, work 




(2)    Organizational structure Stage 0 Departure from the Conventional Structure of 
the Development Organization: Persuasion by the Chief Engineer 
 
The Prius development project introduced permanent changes to the 
organizational structure for product development at Toyota. 
 
                                                            
3  Even after it was decided to pursue the development of the hybrid, Uchiyamada had been developing both of the 
hybrid and the direct injection engine at the outset. However, Syoichiro Toyoda gave instructions, saying, "If you try 
to achieve two things at the same time, you may not accomplish any of them, as a proverb says. 'Between two stools 
you fall to the ground'. Moreover, when you are going to realize a completely new 'hybrid', if you were studying in 
parallel  a type of car with the conventional engine, the staff members would inevitably depend on the latter. 
Therefore, you should concentrate on the hybrid." and thus, the development was eventually focused on the hybrid 
alone.   11 
Under the traditional governance structure for product development at Toyota, the 
product manager (called the "chief engineer" at Toyota now, and "syusa (in Japanese) " 
prior to that) responsible for the vehicle under development horizontally coordinates 
with the body design department, engine department, chassis design department, vehicle 
testing department, and other function-based departments and utilizes their staff 
members to develop the commercial product for which he has responsibility.(Fig 1) 
The chief engineer 
himself does not have a 
large number of junior 
employees under his 
command. Usually he 




such as that for the 
Corolla model, may 
have as many as 15 
assistants.) The chief 
engineer operates much 
like a general chief of 
staff for every stage of 
the process from 
planning to 
development. When 
the company authorizes 
a development project, 
it also authorizes the resources required for that project: namely, the funding and 
man-hours. Thereafter, once the chief engineer has issued a written work order, the 
individual function-based departments must begin performing their assigned tasks.   
This development approach has been gradually improved and refined over the 
Changes in development organization





・A chief engineer has formal authority within the authorized 
funding and man-hours.
・But, even after formal authorization of a project, staff members 
never leave their respective function-based departments. 
Individual staff members participate in multiple projects.
・Prior to formal authorization of a project, the chief engineer has to 

















engineer  12 
some 30 years that Toyota has enlisted its project general manager or "chief engineer" 
system. However, prior to formal authorization of a project, the chief engineer typically 
has to explain to function-based departments why their human resources are needed 
despite the fact authorization has yet to be granted. At Toyota, in that case,the chief 
engineer is expected to convince others why his project is so important that he needs to 
borrow staff members from their departments. For this reason, chief engineers at Toyota 
have traditionally taken great pains to persuade departmental managers to cooperate 
with them. 
 
As regards the G21 Project as well, at the beginning when it was launched in 1994, 
this type of Toyota's traditional development structure was adopted. Generally, 
architectural innovations can somehow be dealt with within the traditional framework of 
the organization in question at their initial stage (Henderson and Clark,1990). Therefore, 
it tends to take a long time for organizations with good achievements before they 
recognize a specific innovation as an architectural innovation. This is one of the reasons 
why architectural innovations often cause problems to organizations with good 
achievements.   
Uchiyamada, however, gave up this Toyota's traditional development 
methodology immediately. When Uchiyamada received instructions to actualize the 
project in 1994, the G21 Project had not yet have authorization as a formal project from 
the company. For that reason, function-based departments were reluctant to provide 
cooperation, saying, "We are quite busy with many other things. Why should we loan 
out our human resources for a venture that had not been assigned a formal project 
status?", says Uchiyamada, recollecting the situation at that time.  As a matter of fact, 
it was at a much later time, in June 1995 to be precise, when the development of the 
Prius was formally given the status of a formal development project of the company.   
 
However, in respect of projects prior to formal authorization, these kinds of 
arguments have been taking place quite often within Toyota vis-à-vis each 
function-based department. Then, why the conventional development structure was 
abandoned for the first time in the case of the G21 Project?     13 
The first reason, among others, was because the development of a hybrid vehicle 
would demand the development of a set of entirely new technologies, and as such, the 
related burden of coordination could be expected to be extraordinarily heavy compared 
to past projects for conventional car models.   
 
Yet, the more fundamentally important point was the following second reason, 
which takes root in the more fundamental argument as to how to dissolve the problem 
relative to Toyota's conventional development structure, which had gradually been 
becoming ostensible at that time. 
Before taking charge of the G21 Project, Uchiyamada was in charge of the 
administration of Technology Department for two years and was working on the review 
of Toyota's R&D organization under Yoshiro Kinbara, Vice President (He is the person 
who accepted first the task of leading the G21 Project). According to Uchiyamada, the 
development organization of Toyota, which was formed based on many years of efforts, 
is basically an excellent one, but a number of problems have also been unrevealed.   
The most serious problem is that each function-based department is individually 
optimized in a way most favorable to its own department, but from the standpoint of the 
entire company, each department is not necessarily behaving in the best interest of the 
entire company. That is, the manager of each function-based department possesses a 
biased preference for his or her own department (conflicting preferences). This is in fact 
a serious problem, and Uchiyamada states that he could observe various problems in 
detail at the development arena from a department in charge of administering 
Technology Department, at a distance.  Uchiyamada says, "I have observed such 
phenomena in many corners of  our R&D organization that virtual walls isolate 
function-based departments from one another, and that even if certain things seem 
apparently desirable for the company as a whole, it is not easy for each function-based 
department to give concessions that should be made in light of such desirable things. 
Thus, I thought that I would not be able to accomplish my project with the traditional 
way of doing, namely with the negation-based approach when I assumed the post of 
leading the G21 Project."  As regards the G21 Project, too, "I received a lot of 
complaints. People said that Technology Department was dissipating money as it likes   14 
at this financially difficult time.", recollects Uchiyamada. "Who was on our side, besides 
Technology Department, was Kiichi Inoue, General Manager of Merchandise Planning 
Department, only, who had proposed the very Project." (Uchiyamada, 2003)      Kinbara, 
who was the superior of Uchiyamada in the administration section of Technology 
Department states also as follows: "People in Engine Department do not like to see the 
weakening of engines and they tend to think of engines before anything else. In fact, 
however, they also need to think about the entire Technology Department and the entire 
company. Toyota is a company selling cars but not engines. Thus, in order to improve 
cars, you need to review the organizational structure, even if (for instance) Engine 
Department should pay some cost for that purpose." (Statement of Kinbara, in 
Uchiyamada, 2003) 
Uchiyamada states further that Toyota's development organization has become so 
large that decisions and communication take time and much time is required before new 
products see the light of day. 
 
Companies can hardly recognize by themselves that the architecture of their 
products has changed with a lapse of time. Therefore, it is necessary to consciously 
undertake studies of architectural changes or studies of new interactions among 
components, and constantly take that matter under careful consideration. For the studies 
of new architecture, however, there are cases where new types of organizations and/or 
human resources with new types of skills that are different from the past are necessary. 
Uchiyamada's career record was fairly atypical for a person appointed by Toyota to 
serve in a chief engineer's position. 
Assuming chief engineers at Toyota still operate the way they always have, a 
person in that position has to know which strings to pull within the company to get their 
project moving in the direction they desire. Consequently, chief engineers are most often 
selected from among staff members with experience as assistants to chief engineers. 
However, Uchiyamada had no experience as a chief engineer or its assistant at all. In 
fact, mechanical engineering was not the area of specialty that he had studied at 
university. His academic background was in applied physics with a specialty focus in 
automated control, an area that Toyota at the time did not even have any employee   15 
openings for. Uchiyamada was initially hired by Toyota only because he had visited the 
Toyota recruiting office asking to take the entrance exam for employee candidates on 
grounds the school research lab with which he was affiliated at the time had not 
received any recruiting materials from Toyota. Because he was a student at a lab that 
Toyota had no plans to recruit new employees from, and at the time was educated in 
automated control technology, a business field Toyota did not handle, the company was 
probably puzzled as to how it could utilize Uchiyamada's skills and thus decided to 
place him on its computer software development team. In that position, his duties 
involved developing computer software for technical applications in the technology 
department. 
Why, then, was Uchiyamada selected to serve as project leader for the Prius 
development project? From the start, the primary goal of the G21 Project was to develop 
a new car model suited for the 21st century. However, that project had another goal: 
namely, to discover a new and as-yet unknown approach to automobile development 
that differed from the conventional approaches utilized to date. (At least this was the 
initial explanation given to Uchiyamada by Kinbara that notified him he was being 
transferred.) Uchiyamada states that he was not consciously striving from the outset to 
make any changes to the way Toyota develops its new cars but instead had to make 
those changes out of sheer necessity. And on that point, he notes: "Because I had no 
knowledge of the conventional development methodology, I was able to achieve what I 
did because I was scared of nothing." 
 
(3)   Organizational    structure Stage 1(the beginning of 1994 to June 1994): The First   
Six Months: Shift from Chief Engineer-based Persuasion to the "Big Room" Approach 
 
By force of necessity, this state of affairs gave rise to the idea of setting up an 
independent team capable of handling a certain amount of study on its own. This was 
the forerunner to the "Big Room" approach, as it was later dubbed within the company. 
Specifically, it was decided that a team of 10 staff members would be assembled in a 
large room to handle the stages from product development to pre-production 
preparations. The team would have its own room, and was to include staff members in   16 
positions ranging from considerably experienced section heads to newly appointed 
group leaders, each with at least 10 years of experience working in a function-based 
department. CAD terminals were brought in and team members were able to prepare 
their own blueprints and technical drawings. The team's office was fully equipped and a 
completely self-contained team structure was put into place so that team members 
would be able to conduct their own discussions without making requests of 
function-based departments in every matter or having to coordinate with them. Only on 
the rare occasion when a certain task was beyond their own capacity would team 
members return to their departments and seek assistance. For example, if they had to 
perform calculations for computer simulations or other tasks that, for example, required 
engaging many people in 
the preparation of 
detailed blueprints, they 
requested departmental 
assistance only with 
those tasks. 
 
Instead, the team 
had a limited amount of 
time to operate and 
requested that the 
function-based 
departments provide 
their human resources to 
it for a period of only six 
months. Because it had 
to come up with tangible 
proposals in six months, 








Changes in development organization
Stage1 –”Big Room” approach
・Self-contained team is capable of handling the stages from product 
development to pre-production preparations.
・The team has its own room.
・The team has a limited amount of time to operate, and the 
function-based departments loan staff members to it for that 
amount of time.
・Those staff  members work exclusively for the development project 
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outstanding staff members to it for that amount of time and treat them as if they were on 
sick leave. Because he had spent two years in a managerial position in a technical 
department, Uchiyamada knew many people inside the company and nominated five of 
the team's 10 members himself. He asked the departments to submit candidates of their 
own for the five remaining positions and had "a good friend" in the personnel 
department check whether the candidates so chosen were actually highly qualified staff 
members or not. As a result, all of the team's members proved to be highly motivated 
individuals capable of conducting fairly extensive independent research within the team 
setting. (Fig2) 
 
In effect, under the traditional approach to vehicle development at Toyota, new 
models were developed one by one in coordination with the function-based departments 
involved. However, for development of the hybrid car, the project team had one staff 
member each supplied from the function-based departments as necessary for a limited 
period of six months. Thereafter, the process of study and research was a responsibility 
of the team itself, and for the ensuing six-month time span, the team was not to 
coordinate its efforts with any of the function-based departments. Afterward, the 




Under the conventional approach, the chief engineer serves as an indirect channel 
of communication when information flows from an engineer affiliated with one 
function-based department to an engineer from another department. By contrast, the 
framework of new "Big Room" approach has the benefit of facilitating direct 
communication between the engineers themselves, encouraging a smoother exchange of 
                                                            
4  The team accepted responsibility for all research and study over the initial six-month period and did not issue a 
single progress report to any of the function-based departments during that time. It actually did request that the 
departments review and discuss the proposals it ultimately prepared. However, in reality, it appears team members 
did stay in touch with the managers of their respective departments and provide summary reports of project progress 
on an informal basis. It is assumed the reason for this is that such team members wanted to maintain close working 
ties with their coworkers in view of the fact they would have to return to their affiliated departments after six months.   
  At the end of the six-month period, departmental managers did not show much resistance when the team's proposals 
were presented to them for discussion. Two reasons can be cited for this. First, it is surmised that team members 
maintained a  certain level of informal contact with their respective departmental managers, as indicated above. 
Second, departmental managers were able to view the team effort as a training exercise for younger staff members 
because, compared to past situations with the conventional approach, their departments supplied only marginal 
human resources to the project.   18 
soft information based on message exchange. (Fig2-2)   
 
Fig2-2  .      Differences in the Flow of Information 
 
               Di;  i  function  based  department           m;  message 
 
"Big Room" has a chief engineer who works together with a team of 
working-level engineers assigned exclusively to the development project for the vehicle 
in question. One distinguishing feature of this model compared to the conventional 
approach is that each of the engineers on the team is responsible only for duties related 
to that vehicle development project. Under this governance structure, the engineers on 
the team leave their respective function-based departments and report directly to the 
chief engineer. We can notice here another advantage of the "Big Room" approach. That 
is, in the case of the conventional approach, because engineers maintain a strong sense 
of belonging to the function-based department they belong to, they are influenced by the 
biased preference of their department, resulting in partial optimization. By contrast, in 
the case of the "Big Room" approach, because engineers are organizationally separated 
from the function-based department they belong to, they are rarely influenced by biased 
preferences of the function-based departments, and from the standpoint of the entire 
company, they can devote themselves to the achievement of development objectives for 
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Despite the fact that most Japanese automakers including Toyota had been moving 
in general to strengthen the role of their product managers (chief engineer), they did not 
utilize a project execution team model like this "Big Room" approach, except for 




Why was a project execution team model like the"Big Room" approach not 
implemented by Japanese automaker? In noting the reasons for this, Clark and Fujimoto 
(1991) made the following comments based on the outcome of their study: "Their worst 
fear was that engineers with specialized roles [in function-based departments] would be 
spread out and placed into full-time positions in a single [car development] project, 
resulting in a loss of accumulated expertise [in the core technologies that function-based 
departments commanded]. They preferred the conventional product manager model that 
enabled individual working-level engineers to participate in multiple projects." 
(Chapter9:text in brackets added by author.) 
We refer to this loss of accumulated expertise in a core technology as a "dilution 
cost." It is necessary that technological advances in function-based departments be more 
highly valued and protected when advances in a core technology are vital. When it is the 
case, a project execution team model like "Big Room" approach was shunned because it 
implied higher dilution costs and because automakers preferred organizational structures 
that stressed function-based departments. This same point can help explain why the 
"firm within a firm" or skunkworks (teams of highly autonomous engineers assigned the 
mission of generating new ideas) approaches are prone to failure. 
The U.S. automaker Chrysler Corp. went a step further than its Japanese 
counterparts and actually implemented an approach akin to the "Big Room" approach , 
and ultimately experienced failure in that undertaking. In the early 1990s, Chrysler 
adopted its "platform team system," which assembled a dedicated team of professional 
members for each of the company’s base models and put those teams in their own big 
rooms for development (Fujimoto, 1997, p. 275). At the outset, this approach helped to 
                                                            
5  As examples of emergency projects and other special situations, Fujimoto (1997) cites Honda's effort to meet 
revised "kei-car" (ultra-light subcompact car) standards with its "Today" model and the development of Mazda's 
Eunos Roadster model (p. 275). The Honda project was completed in only one year and the Mazda project, in only 
one year and half.   20 
drastically cut development project lead times and demonstrated significant benefits. 
Eventually, though, it failed and the dilution costs outlined above were the reason for 
that failure. For example, the engine engineers involved only had their minds on engine 
for a given model developed by the teams with which they were affiliated. No one was 
thinking about the evolution of engine technology as a whole. 
 
On the other hand, because implementation under the "Big Room" arrangement in 
case of the Prius development project is time-limited, it does not interfere significantly 
with the environmental adaptation of individual function-based departments and thus 
has few drawbacks. Drawbacks that were a justification for not applying the project 
execution team model such as "Big room" approach in the past were readily overcome 
by limiting the time frame for application. Although this may have been a coincidence 
attributable to the force of necessity, it is clearly an innovation in the structure of the 
development organization
6
The Prius hybrid-car development project provided a crucial opportunity to use 
the "Big Room" approach. Since then, that approach has found widespread use in many 
of Toyota's new car development projects and has fostered lasting changes in the 
structure of Toyota's development organization for new car models. "It was quite new 
that this level of dialogues [dialogues among engineers belonging to different 
function-based departments] are made at the initial stage of product development. This 
became the model for the subsequent development of new cars." says Toshiharu Ishida, 
who was one of the members of the G21 Project (Egawa ,Reinhardt    and Yao, 2006) . 
. 
 
(4)  Organizational structure Stage 2 (June 1994 to October 1997): Shift back to 
Conventional System and the Adoption of Promotion Meeting. 
 
                                                            
6  Honda, not Toyota, has been sometimes called the founder of the "Big Room" approach as implemented in Japan. 
To be sure, Honda has a track record of formally issuing instructions for its engineers to work as members in "Big 
Room". However, such instructions notwithstanding, it has not required that its development  project members 
actually physically assemble in the same "Big Room". Physically speaking, they remain at their desks in the 
function-based departments where they normally work. In real terms, this approach is understood to be not that 
different from the "Chief Engineer" framework that Toyota developed. Honda's "Big Room" approach is not 
conceptually built around the "Big Room" approach in case of Prius project.    It can not be interpreted as an attempt 
to facilitate the exchange of soft information among project members.   21 
As promised, after six months, the "Big Room" arrangement was dissolved and all 
of the engineers that had been on loan returned to their affiliated departments. In other 
words, the development framework shifted back to    the conventional "Chief Engineer" 
model. Only conferences that met on selected days of the week to discuss specific 
themes continued to be held. 
 
However, the cost of coordinating the working-level engineers (who had returned 
to their posts) with their departmental supervisors became higher after shifting back to 
the conventional framework. Because the development project's members (the 
working-level engineers) continued to share ideas with one another, all were clearly 
aware of the specific tasks that they were responsible for within the project, but relations 
with middle management in the function-based departments became more problematic. 
Owing to the possibility that departmental managers and middle managers in the 
function-based departments would feel as though they were being kept in the dark about 
the project, development team members ended up spending an inordinate amount of 
time coordinating with them. For example, when subordinates delivered operational 
reports to the managerial staff, they were asked why they were engaged in such work or 
compelled to listen to suggestions for ways of doing their work better. That was in a 
sense ill-natured treatment. Hence, even decisions that had already been settled by team 
members themselves were occasionally called into question again by these supervisors. 
As a consequence, team members found their workloads needlessly burdened by the 
expectation that they coordinate with departmental managers and middle management 
personnel in addition to coordinating with one another.   
 
To address this problem, a decision was made to hold meetings with these 
managerial staff members present. This was the background to the adoption of 
company-wide Promotion Meetings. Ordinary directors are the highest management 
level attending these promotion meetings. Senior managing directors, vice presidents, 
etc. do not attend. Promotion Meetings are attended by members from not only technical 
departments, but also other departments throughout the company, including production, 
finance, and so forth. The company-wide Promotion Meetings at Toyota have no formal   22 
authority, whatsoever. 
Their objectives are to 
share information and 
coordinate management 
vectors. In terms of 
content, the impression 
is participating 
managers are told to 
refrain from making 
needless comments to 
individual engineers 
because that tends to 
inflate the related 
coordination costs. 
Instead, they are urged 
to use the meetings as a 
vehicle for the 
presentation of their 
own views, should they 
have any they wish to 
express. To be honest, 
the development team members were the most informed, at least with regard to the 
technical issues of the hybrid-car at the time. On such matters, directors and managers 
had nothing of value to say. Nonetheless, now, whenever development team members 
sought managerial consensus for something they wished to pursue, they already had 
departmental understanding and were no longer individually subjected to needless 
instructions or viewpoints.(Fig3) 
 
Even so, the meetings still had significance that extended beyond the solution of 
purely emotional or interpersonal issues. There was real value in having the 
departmental managers of function-based departments included in the promotion 
Changes in development organization
Stage2 –Shift back to the conventional model
・As promised, after a fixed period, the “Big Room” arrangement was 
dissolved and all of the staff members returned to their affiliated 
function-based departments.
・Only conferences that met on selected days of the week continued  
to be held.
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meetings. The reason was that these departmental managers possessed private 
information that no one else knew about. For example, they as well as 
middle-management staff members had information pertaining to recent trends in 
exhaust-gas countermeasures and other environmental regulations, trends in car design, 
and so forth. Because this was information on headline topics, it was advisable that it be 
shared so that team members involved in development of the hybrid car could take it 
under consideration as soon as possible. Hence, the company-wide promotion meetings 
served as a framework to facilitate a smoother transmission of messages pertaining to 
private information held by departmental managers and everyone under them. Prior to 
the development of its Prius model, Toyota had a ceremonial promotion conference that 
had been set up to help its directors save face. However, compared to the company-wide 




(5) Influence on the Post-Prius structure of Toyota’s development organization 
 
The term-limited implementation of the "Big Room" approach as described above 
did bring about lasting changes to Toyota's organizational framework for vehicle 
development. That is not to imply, however, that it had been intended to cause 
significant changes in development procedure itself. The changes that took place were 
implemented because circumstances forced their implementation. Against the backdrop 
of an international wave of measures to mitigate global warming, the top management at 
Toyota demonstrated an urgency toward development that in turn put pressure on the 
development process. In other words, the stringent constraints imposed by a short lead 
time starkly highlighted the limits of the existing model of governance structure and had 
the effect of setting the stage for the debut of a new governance structure.       
The deadline to start commercial production of the Prius was revised several times, 
almost to an unusual extent, and each time it became shorter and shorter. Initially, 
then-company president Hiroshi Okuda,who assumed the post of President in August 
1995, instructed that the new model be ready before the end of the 20th century (1999).   24 
Acting in line with Okuda's expectation, Akihiro Wada, Vice President in charge of 
development, set a target date of December 1998, one year earlier, and notified the 
development team to that effect. However, President Okuda then issued additional 
instructions designating December 1997 as the new deadline. Although Vice-President 
Wada protested that there would not be enough time, President Okuda overruled his 
objections. At this time, the development team made one request of the president. They 
declared they would aim for a December 1997 deadline and noted that the development 
process would experience several milestones, and requested that the product launch be 
delayed beyond the end of 1997 should any uncertainties of a technical nature, including 
questions of product reliability, arise as a result of evaluations conducted when they 
reach those milestones. This resulted in a consensus. In other words, the development 
team started their work with December 1997 set as the target deadline for the first car to 
roll off the assembly line, and with the understanding this target would be pushed back 
if it proved too tough to meet. As noted earlier, when this project got under way in 1994, 
it had not yet received internal authorization as a formal project, and as a consequence, 
function-based departments did not readily submit to team requests for cooperation 
because in their view, they were not being asked to contribute resources to a formally 
approved venture. However, given the unusually short target deadline set for the Prius' 
commercial launch, there was no time to follow standard internal procedures. Hence, as 
a matter of necessity, the project leader, Uchiyamada, came up with the idea of creating 
a team that could independently handle much of the required study on its own.   
In reality,however,Toyota could achieve the mass production of the Prius in October 
1997,two months earlier than scheduled. 
Looking back, he noted that setting a short development time frame actually 
proved to be a good thing, for had it been any longer, the work of the project team might 
have dragged on without ever getting the car into production. 
 
Although, in the years since the Prius was developed, the "Big Room" approach 
has undergone a number of variations in response to development project scale. In 
addition to the aforementioned time-limited type that was applied in the development of 
the first Prius model, Toyota has also implemented a weaker version whereby team   25 
members assemble in the project room only on selected days of the week. With this 
latter approach, team members in reality have physical access to the room facilities at all 
times and on visits to the room, are always able to examine information about the new 
car development project of their own. And engineers specialized in a given area may 
assemble for meetings on, say, just one day of the week: for example, body system 
engineers on Mondays, or engine-system engineers on Wednesdays. This selected-day 
format becomes dominant because it is believed to have been implemented as one of the 
ideas aimed at preventing significant interference with the environmental adaptation of 
function-based departments. But this format clearly has a limit for coordination among 
the function-based departments. 
 
Also, after the first Prius model had been developed, company-wide promotion 
meetings sometimes came into use for large-scale projects at Toyota, too. For example, 
promotion meetings were adopted for the IMV Project (a project aimed at placing five 
different car bodies on the same chassis platform) and a global cost-reduction program 
for the Corolla model.(Fig4) 
 
   26 
3.   Organizational Economics-based Interpretation about the Changes 
in the Development Organization Structure 
 
(1) Allocation of formal authority 
 
When each manager possesses a biased preference for his or her own department, 
it is important to consider the impact that the allocation of formal authority and the 
information flow within the organizational hierarchy has on the organizational capacity 
for change (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1999; Alonso, 
Dessein, and Matouschek, 2008; Rantakari, 2008). The holders of local information are 
the individual departments within the company. The nature of the changes that the 
organization should undergo will be dependent on the full body of this information held 
by individual departments. Given this understanding, it may be advisable for the 
company's headquarters to delegate decision-making authority to the managers of these 
individual departments. However, if decision-making authority is delegated to 
individual departments or to the managers representing the interests of each of those 
departments, those departments may pursue their own interests even at the expense of 
the company's interests as a whole.   
If we confine the argument to the development of vehicles, the manager of each 
function-based department holds private information about his or her respective 
department's fields of expertise and technological advances, and product manager of the 
developed vehicle is not aware of that information. However, from the standpoint of 
developing a new vehicle that is useful for the company, the manager of each 
function-based department has a biased preference. By contract, the product manager 
does not have private information but is thinking about the developed new vehicle as a 
whole and thus does not have a biased preference. The question then, is, what kind of 
governance structure will serve as the optimal solution? 
 
In the case of Toyota Motor, too, this point has been an important issue for a long 
time when planning its development organization structure. 
Development of the first Prius model by Toyota set the stage for adoption of a new   27 
development organization structure. Though the conventional chief engineer structure 
exemplified modeled Toyota's development organization prior to the Prius, following 
the start of the Prius project, the development organization temporarily adopted the “Big 
Room” structure for a limited period and then transitioned to the chief engineer and 
company-wide Promotion Meetings structure.   
 
In this Section 3, we attempt to examine such questions as "Where, to begin with, 
did exist the rationality for the conventional chief engineer structure of Toyota Motor 
having been adopted?" and "Where did exist the rationality of such a model being 
shifted to new development organization structures including the "Big Room" approach, 
taking the opportunity of the development of the Prius?", by studying at length the 
transfiguration of Toyota's development organization structure from the viewpoint of 
organizational economics framework.       
 
(2) Rationality of Conventional “Chief Engineer”structure at Toyota 
 
The conventional “Chief Engineer” structure at Toyota has been the successful 
model of governance structure that Toyota devised and that came into widespread use 
not only among automakers in Japan but worldwide. The product manager in this case 
(“Chief Engineer”) has direct contact with working-level engineers, wields strong 
powers of direct and indirect influence over all project-related function-based 
departments and operations, and has responsibilities in the areas of product planning and 
conceptualization (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991；Fujimoto, 1997). 
 
But in relation to our own research objectives, it raises questions about where the 
scope of authority retained by the chief engineer ends and where the scope of authority 
delegated to function-based departments begins. 
On that point, in this paper, we attempt a detailed analysis of the internal 
allocation of formal authority under the existing Toyota approach, the paradigm as 





To state a conclusion first, in terms of organizational economics framework, the 
structure of Toyota's vehicle development organization does "centralize" formal 
authority in the hands of chief engineers, to a certain limited scope in advance. That 
scope is delineated by limits or constraints on the formal authority that individual 
managers of function-based departments have over the affairs of their respective 
departments. One important characteristic feature is that chief engineers at Toyota have 
formal authority over matters pertaining to the vehicles for which they are responsible, 
and the scope of that authority is such that the managers of function-based departments 
(e.g., managers of the body design department or the engine department) have no formal 
authority of their own. In other words, formal authority of a predefined scope has been 
concentrated or centralized in the hands of the product manager ("Chief Engineer"). 
 
The actual process of concentrating formal authority in the hands of the chief 
engineer and the scope of that concentration are as follows. Whenever a development 
project is given the go-ahead at Toyota formally, the chief engineer will be allocated a 
certain number of man-hours and a budget to cover development costs (for example, 
500,000 man-hours for body design and 15 billion yen for total development). Within 
these boundaries, the chief engineer can issue written work directives "shijisyo" (formal 
work orders) to the working-level engineers in a given function-based department 
without obtaining approval from that department's manager. Because these are formal 
work orders, they cannot be overridden or ignored. However, decisions as to which of 
their working-level engineers may be used still rest with the managers of function-based 
departments. Chief engineers do not have the formal authority for that. Should a chief 
engineer wish to utilize a specific individual, he or she will have no recourse other than 
to negotiate with and persuade the manager of the department with which that individual 
is affiliated. 
Generally speaking, there are different models of governance structure are 
                                                            
7  Toyota's success spurred the adoption of the conventional “Chief Engineer”  approach by other automakers 
worldwide from the mid 1970s through the 1980s.   29 
conceivable. : 1) Authority over the affairs of each function-based department has been 
delegated  to  the  manager  of  that  department  (Decentralized  authority).               
2) Authority over the affairs of all of the function-based departments is held by the 
product manager (Centralized authority). 3) Authority of a predefined scope has been 
concentrated or centralized in the hands of the product manager (Partial 
centralization)(Rantakari (2008)).  And the "chief engineer" structure at Toyota is 
considered to belong to the "partial centralization".   
 
Accordingly, the routine job of a chief engineer is to utilize and put to work as his 
own subordinates those working-level engineers from function-based departments that 
have been allocated to his project. However, when the chief engineer judges that an 
engineer under his supervision faces a technical problem that is beyond that engineer's 
ability level, he will consult with departmental managers and in some cases, with 
company executives. The decision to take this step is at the discretion of the chief 
engineer himself. Unless he has good judgment, his development project could face the 
risk of becoming bogged down. 
The chief engineer is typically supported by three to five assistants. Assistants are 
chosen as candidates for service as future chief engineers and have ranks as section 
chiefs or higher. However, they do not represent function-based departments with which 
they were affiliated. Although they may be affiliated with different departments, a 
relatively larger number of assistants are chosen from the car design or chassis design 
departments in view of their ability to read design blueprints or technical drawings. The 
traditional approach to the training of chief engineers resembled the apprenticeship 
system. Many chief engineers and their assistants were affiliated more often with the car 
design or chassis design departments and less often with the engine design or other 
components design departments or the testing department. However, Takeshi 
Uchiyamada, the employee chosen to serve as chief engineer for the Prius project, was 
affiliated with the testing department, marking an exception to the general rule. What is 
more, he had no experience whatsoever as a chief engineer's assistant. That is to say, he 
was not an individual who had received the training he would have been expected to 
receive under the traditional apprenticeship-like system for chief engineers. Whether the   30 
choice was intentional or not, it conversely had a side-benefit in allowing Uchiyamada 
to pursue an all-out, systematic development venture precisely because he had no 
background knowledge of Toyota's conventional approach to product development. In 
fact, Uchiyamada was told by Yoshiro Kinbara, who had been Uchiyamada's superior in 
the administration section of Technology Development Department that, as the leader of 
the G21 Project, Uchiyamada, who is not an expert of the conventional approach, is 
most appropriate. 
 
To summarize, within established quotas of, say, XX hours for Department A, YY 
hours for Department B, and ZZ billion yen for the entire development budget, formal 
authority is concentrated in the hands of the product manager (chief engineer). This is 
the model of successful conventional governance structure of Toyota's vehicle 
development organization. 
 
Now we would like to compare this model for the conventional chief engineer 
structure at Toyota with other structural models and examine the rationality as to why 
the conventional chief engineer structure was adopted.   
One of the structural models that can be compared with as regards the 
development organization structure for vehicles is the simple function-based 
organization. The organization structure exists at each departmental level and there are 
no individuals in the organization that have broad horizontal responsibility for any 
product development project in its entirety. This would be a typical structure of 
“Decentralized authority”, where formal authority has been allocated to the manager of 
each function-based department in the organization
8
In the meantime, we can also find a different model from that of "chief engineer" 
structure at Toyota, among structural models where a product manager in the 
organization exists. The product manager for a given product development project 
handles the coordination of working-level engineers either directly or through liaison 
officers. Toyota's chief engineer structure is the one, directly handling such coordination, 
. 
                                                            
8  This portrays an organizational structure such as that enlisted in the past by Mercedes Benz and other European 
automobile manufacturers.   31 
and the model that can be compared with Toyota's model is the one, handling the 
coordination through liaison officers. The project manager in the latter case is 
sometimes referred to as "lightweight product manager"  as he or she has a relatively 
weak coordination power, while the chief engineer at Toyota is sometimes referred to as 
"heavyweight product manager" (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991).  The vertical 
relationships represent internal relationships within each individual function-based 
department while the horizontal relationships illustrate coordination relationships for 
specific product development projects. Individual function-based departments (e.g., the 
body design department, engine department, chassis design department, vehicle testing 
department) are supervised by their respective departmental managers. Liaison officers 
are simple contact points for their respective departments. By contrast, there are 
working-level engineers in positions of substance inside the function-based departments. 
Because the lightweight product manager does not have direct ties to 
working-level engineers of "substance" and thus has less power than the departmental 
managers, the product manager has limited powers of influence particularly outside the 
product development related departments. He or she has quite weak  responsibilities 
with regard to product conceptualization. Communication and coordination are the 
primary duties of the lightweight product manager. The rationality for the conventional 
chief engineer structure of Toyota Motor is owing to the background that a strong need 
for interdepartmental coordination was created, in order to materialize unique product 
concepts that draw attention of, satisfy and please users and to realize outstanding 
product development performance. 
However, one point we must give special stress about lightweight product 
manager model here in connection with the objectives of our own research is as follows. 
In terms of organizational economics framework, it is true that there is no characteristics 
of centralized arrangement at all because individual function-based departments retain 
formal authority over their own affairs completely (“decentralized authority”) while 
product managers are given no authority whatsoever. On this point, lightweight product 
manager model is significantly different from conventional chief engineer model at 
Toyota. Naturally, under lightweight product manager model, coordination on products 
to be developed will be weaker. Conversely, however, individual function-based   32 
departments will be better able to adapt to their respective environments. In terms of the 
relationship to automobile development organizations, suffice it to say that 
internationally, the lightweight product manager model was once the most common 
structure observed to be in use among automakers prior to the spread of Toyota's 
conventional chief engineer model. 
 
(3) Why was the "Big Room" approach introduced, taking the opportunity of developing 
the Prius?   
 
Note that the aforementioned models of governance structure are marked by 
increasing levels of integration as one move from a simple function-based organization 
to the lightweight product manager model, then the “chief engineer” structure at Toyota, 
and finally the "Big Room" approach.   
If we apply an organizational economics framework, the following analysis is 
possible. 
For the purposes of simplification, the organization consists of two function-based 
departments and one product manager(headquarters). The manager of each 
function-based department possesses assorted field-specific information about which the 
product manager is unaware (private information). However, from the company's 
perspective, the manager of each function-based department possesses a biased 
preference for his or her own department. Consider the problems of coordination 
between two function-based departments, i and j. Expressed as an equation, i's 
preference is 
 
Πi  ＝  Ki －  ki ((1－ri) (θi－di)
 2 ＋ ri (dj－di)
2)   
 
where di and dj respectively stand for decisions made by departments i and j. 
ri  ∈(0, 1)  is a value expressing the relative importance of coordination with 




i］is an expression 
for the environment faced by department i, and the value of this expression is private   33 
information known only by the i’s departmental manager . Each departmental manager 
is in a position to issue a (nonverifiable) message mi, mj   of some kind that will enable 
him to use this environmental information to his own advantage.   
That is, first, sender learns the state of the world, θ.  Second, sender chooses a 
message, m. Third, receiver gets the message and chooses a decision, d. Fourth, payoffs 
are decided. This game allows for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (when the player's 
own beliefs are the basis for predicting moves by the other player, each move needs to 
be optimal and the beliefs need to be correct at the equilibrium). If the problem is 
formulated in this way, the objective will be to identify the functional relationship to 
desirable governance structure when the characteristics of each  function-based 
department are treated as givens. Each function-based departmental manager learns the 
environmental conditions affecting his or her own department, strives to communicate 
with the personnel that have formal authority, and considers what information content 
(message) to convey to that personnel. Afterward, a decision will be made by the person 
with formal authority. By taking into consideration the strategic actions of each person, 
it is possible to endogenously and simultaneously determine both the quality of 
decisions made on the basis of available information and the accuracy of the information 
conveyed when the allocation of formal authority within the organization and the 
environmental conditions are treated as given.  In such cases, the structure of 
communication within the organization can be modeled with the game-theory concept of 
a "cheap talk" game (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Gibbons, 1992)；Alonso, Dessein, and 
Matouschek, 2008 ； Rantakari, 2008).  Depending on the governance structure 
implemented, there will be a trade-off between the "coordination" of individual 
operations within the corporation and the extent of environmental "adaptation" achieved 
by each function-based departments.   
When the parameters are altered, the way in which the equilibrium organization 
structure changes will be key. The conclusion here is that when ri  is a large value 
(signifying a strong need for interdepartmental coordination), a structure of more 
centralized authority (as in the “chief engineer” structure at Toyota) or the "Big Room" 
approach  is desirable, whereas when ri  is small, a structure of more decentralized 
authority (as in a simple function-based organization or the lightweight product manager   34 
model) is desirable. The significance of this conclusion is that choices made when 
allocating formal authority within the organizational hierarchy are influenced by a 
trade-off between interdepartmental communication quality and function-based 
departmental decision quality.  That is, when interdepartmental communication quality 
is more important, the "more-centralized authority" model will be chosen, and when 
function-based departmental decision quality is more important, a "more-decentralized 
authority" model will be the rational choice.  From an organizational economics 
perspective, the implication is that the " more-centralized authority" model of the 
development organization is the optimal choice when, in terms of developing a new car, 
the relative importance of coordination with function-based departments (r) is fairly 
high and, from the standpoint of the function-based departments concerned, the relative 
importance of coordination with the car's development team (r) is low. The findings of 
this economic analysis seem consistent with the development organization structure 
which automobile industry created.  In other words, the fact that Toyota's "chief 
engineer" structure or the "more-centralized authority" model had spread among 
automobile makers in the world from 1970s to 1980s and become more dominant 
compared with a simple function-based organization or the "lightweight product 
manager" model based on the "more-decentralized authority" model is owing to the 
background that a strong need for interdepartmental coordination was created, in order 
to materialize unique product concepts that draw attention of, satisfy and please users 
and to realize outstanding product development performance, amid ever intensifying, 
dynamic, competitive environment of the automobile industry.     
 
Then, notwithstanding the situation where the integration of Toyota's development 
organization structure seemed to have stopped with the adoption of the "chief engineer" 
structure, why did the development of the first Prius model set the stage for adoption of 
a new development organization structure, the "Big Room" approach? 
Though the “chief engineer”  structure exemplified Toyota's development 
organization prior to the Prius, following the start of the Prius project, the development 
organization temporarily adopted the "Big Room" structure for a limited period. This 
adoption of a new development organization structure or pattern succeeded in averting   35 
one drawback of the "Big Room" structure -- inflated dilution costs -- by limiting the 
period of time that the "Big Room" structure would be implemented. That is, during the 
initial development stage (the first six months in the case of the Prius), the desire for 
strong coordination among function-based departments took precedence over concerns 
for dilution costs because of the importance of concept design, among other factors, 
particularly in the context of innovative development project. For that reason, the "Big 
Room" structure was the rational choice compared to the conventional “chief engineer” 
structure. Once the initial development stage had elapsed, the benefits of divisional 
coordination faded and the dilution costs became relatively more pronounced, making 
the use of the "Big Room" structure irrational and the transition to the conventional 
“chief engineer” structure a better choice.   
In effect, if attention is focused on the time path for ri, it will be noted that concept 
design, or in other words interdepartmental coordination, was more important in the 
initial phase of development (the first six months) because the development project 
itself was of such a highly innovative nature. That is, for larger values of ri, 
interdepartmental communication quality was more important than the quality of 
departmental decisions of function-based departments, and thus,  the "Big Room" 
structure was the development organization structure of choice for implementation. By 
contrast, after the initial six months, work on the concept design of the product 
development had been almost completed and interdepartmental coordination had 
become less important to the company compared with advances in the technologies for 
the engine and other component systems. For that reason, the development organization 
was transitioned to a more decentralized structure of governance. In other words, Toyota 
adapted its development organization structure to a changed set of conditions whereby 
decision quality of function-based departments was more important than communication 
quality. And furthermore,  the adoption of company-wide Promotion Meetings was 
chosen over the traditional “chief engineer”  structure  from among the more 
decentralized structures of governance because it better facilitated mutual message 
exchange. 
 
However, if you take the matter under more elaborate consideration, you are able   36 
to say that there is not much difference between the "chief engineer" structure and the 
"Big Room" approach from the aspect of the difference in degrees of centralization of 
formal authority to the chief engineer (in other words, both approaches seem to be 
categorized into "partial centralization" to the chief engineer, more or less to the same 
degree). Nevertheless, more theoretical reinforcement may be required if you are to 
explain why the development of the first Prius model by Toyota set the stage for 
adoption of a new development organization structure; the "Big Room" approach. On 
that point, if we apply an organizational economics framework, the following analysis 
becomes possible.   
When the information that an organization obtained has become old, and if the 
organization has to make a decision based on such old information, there is a risk that 
the situation and environment surrounding the organization has changed in the 
meantime. Therefore, the efficiency of the organization as a whole may also be assessed 
by the delay time between the point when the organization first obtained the information 
and the point when the organization makes a decision based on the information    Delay 
is costly in decision problems because it increases the lag upon which decisions are 
based. Based on such a way of thinking, a group of studies called "team theoretic 
approach" within organizational economics have evolved (Bolton and Dewatripont, 
1994; Garicano and Van Zandt,    ；Radner, 1993; Van Zandt, 2003).    It is said here 
that depending on the environment surrounding the organization  (or depending on 
parameters), there is a possibility that the "freshness" of certain information becomes 
important.   
If we apply the team theoretic approach to the development process of the Prius, 
we can say the following. 
At the point of time of "Stage 0" before the adoption of the "Big Room" structure, 
working-level engineers belong to their respective function-based departments and excel 
in their respective functional expertise.    Thus, at that point of time, they are possessed 
of the most up-to-date functional information at Stage 0.   
However, at Stage 1, when the "Big Room" approach is adopted and first-class 
working-level engineers are selected from function-based departments and they leave 
their respective function-based departments to enter the "Big Room", they are now to   37 
report to the chief engineer of the Prius instead of their department managers. Thus, 
from the viewpoint of the freshness of possessed information, these working-level 
engineers are able to hold the most up-to-date product information about the Prius at 
Stage 1 (this is an advantage of the "Big Room" structure). On the other hand, as regards 
the functional information, they are possessed of old information at Stage 0 (information 
of one term earlier) only and such information is no more renewed (this is a 
disadvantage of the "Big Room" structure). Therefore, unless you limit the time span to 
adopt the "Big Room" structure, functional information held by these first-class 
working-level engineers gets older and older and the magnitude of disadvantage 
gradually exceeds the magnitude of advantage from the aspect of the company as a 
whole.   
Thus, at Stage 2 which starts after 6 months of Stage 1, it becomes rational to 
dissolve the full-time "Big Room" and to send back these working-level engineers to 
their respective function-based departments. The above-stated story can be explained 
simply from the reason of computational delay, with no regards to the problems 
associated with incentives or allocation of authorities within the organization.                 
Because the pace of departmental technological advancement has become truly 
rapid in recent years, there have been signs of an internal trend toward shorter time 
frames for the "Big Room" approach with an earlier return to a decentralized structure 
(the conventional “chief engineer”  structure) at Toyota. This can be considered a 
rational choice in terms of the economic models described above. This deserves 
recognition as an organizational innovation Toyota engineered through its Prius 
development program. 
 
By the way, at Stage 2, when working-level engineers have returned to their 
respective function-based departments, they are not necessarily able to acquire the most 
up-to-date functional information at Stage 2 immediately. Should function-based 
departmental managers and middle-level managers possess the latest, functionally 
valuable business information about their departments and other private information at 
Stage 2, there is a risk that company's costs could escalate if the latest information were 
not utilized for the purpose of developing the Prius. Thus, in order to make the most of   38 
the latest functional information at Stage 2 for the development of the Prius as swiftly as 
possible, it can be understood that promotion meetings composed of departmental 
managers and middle-level managers in the function-based departments as members 
were created so as to share information. The promotion meetings do not have any formal 
authority. Toyota's creation of the promotion meetings encouraged information sharing, 
such that the formal authority held by departmental managers and chief engineers would 
remain intact as-is, and departmental and middle-level managers of function-based 
departments would utilize the meeting framework for the early submission of messages 
relating to matters outside their authority (i.e., matters over which chief engineers had 
control). In this way, Toyota both encouraged information-sharing while offsetting the 
drawbacks of the conventional “chief engineer” structure.   
Efficiency accounts of the firm argue that the multidivisional governance structure 
arose and succeeded because it reduced costs by creating a clear distinction between 
strategic and tactical plannings. But examining new evidence in the paradigmatic case of 
General Motors ,GM intentionally violated the axioms of efficient organization to create 
managerial consent (Sloan, 1963). That is, the divisions become involved in long-term 
planning and performance evaluation through gaining representation on the committees 
dealing with overseeing governance (“participative decentralization”, Freeland, 1996). 
Although there is a difference between GM and Toyota in the purpose of 
information-sharing where in the case of GM, it is  intended to share information 
possessed by individual operations segregated by the types of final products, while in 
the case of the promotion meetings of Toyota, it is intended to share information 
possessed by individual function-based departments such as the body design department, 
engine department, chassis design department, vehicle testing department and so forth, 
both companies are similar in the sense that they place an importance on the function of 
the interdepartmental committee, which does not have any formal authority but has the 




Success by Toyota Motor of the world's first mass-produced hybrid vehicle, the   39 
first Prius model, has drawn attention worldwide and changed completely the way of 
doing business by the automobile industry. However, it has been hardly studied 
theoretically and empirically as to how such architectural innovation was possible 
within the largest organizations in Japan ; Toyota Motor, and what impact the 
development has exerted upon the development organization of automobiles.   
In this paper, we attempted to examine such questions as "Where, to begin with, 
did exist the rationality for the conventional chief engineer structure of Toyota Motor 
(before the development of the Prius) having been adopted?" and "Where did exist the 
rationality of such a model being shifted to new development organization structures ; 
the "Big Room" approach, taking the opportunity of the development of the Prius?", by 
studying at length the development process of the Prius and transfiguration of Toyota's 
development organization structure from the viewpoint of organizational economics 
framework. On that occasion, we attempted to perform an assessment from the 
perspective of organizational economics, and we particularly put our focus upon the 
problem of the occurrence of sectional optimization owing to the existence of a biased 
preference for each functional department and the way of changing such sectional 
optimization to corporal optimization and the ways of allocating formal authorities 
within the development organization of the company. Furthermore, we touched upon the 
point that delay is costly in decision problems because it increases the lag upon which 
decisions are based, and evaluated the new development organization structure from that 
viewpoint, too.   
As a result, it was not only made clear that the new development organization 
structure is a kind of hybrid organization, which lies between "centralization" and 
"decentralization", but also that such a structure is rational from the standpoint of a 
product development organization. A main argument is that the development 
organization temporarily adopted the "Big Room" structure for a limited period of time. 
This adoption of a new development organization structure succeeded in averting one 
drawback of the "Big Room" structure -- inflated dilution costs -- by limiting the period 
of time that the "Big Room" structure is implemented. 
 
Recollecting the first days of the development, Uchiyamada, who served as the   40 
chief engineer of the first Prius model, says, "I was quite worried that everyone engaged 
in the development of the Prius would conduct his or her work in the same manner as 
for vehicles equipped with conventional gasoline-powered engines, transmissions and 
other equipments, ordinarily developed by Toyota. I thought that, if they follow the 
conventional way, the development of the Prius would never turn out successful." And 
he thus told engineers involved in the development of the Prius, "The development of 
new vehicles in recent years is being handled just systematically, but the development of 
our new car (Prius) will not be proceeded with in that way. We are just in the same 
situation as that where our forerunners of 2-3 generations before developed a new car 
some 30 to 40 years ago. We should therefore think as if we were back to 30 to 40 years 
ago, and we should not assume the posture that we knew everything. Let's anyway 
gather at the working place and think together how to solve the problem in front of a car 
with problems, by actually observing the phenomena."     
The work processes and organizations in use by industry today are already 
optimized for the production of modern goods. That is why they are still in use despite 
gradual changes made over many years. Conversely, it follows that while they are not 
necessarily bad when it comes to the task of developing and producing new and 
innovative products that do not yet exist, our modern work processes and organizations 
may not always be ideal. One cannot develop an entirely new product unless one also 
devotes attention to new organizations and approaches for the task at hand. Further, 
success will remain out of reach unless this requirement is also recognized by one's 
peers   41 
References 
 
Abernathy, W. J., and Utterback, J. M., “Patterns of Industrial Innovation,” Technology 
Review, 1978, 80(5), pp.41-47. 
 
Aghion, P., and Tirole, J., “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,” Journal of 
Political Economy, 1997, 105(1), pp.1-29.   
 
Alonso, R., Dessein,  W.,  and Matouschek, N.,  (2008).  “When Does Coordination 
Require Centralization?” American Economic Review, 2008, 98(1), pp.145-179. 
 
Baker, G. P., Gibbons, R., and Murphy, K. J., Informal Authority in Organizations. 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1999, 15(1), pp.56-73.   
 
Baldwin, C. Y., and Clark, K. B., Design Rules: The Power of Modularity, MIT Press, 
2000. 
 
Bolton, P.,  and Dewatripont, M.,  “The  Firm as a Communication Network,”  The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, 109(4), pp.809-839. 
 
Bresnahan, T.,  Greenstein, S.,  and Henderson, R.,  “Making Waves: The Interplay 
between Market Incentives and Organizational Capabilities  in the Evolution of 
Industries,” 2007, mimeo. 
 
Clark, K. B.,  and Fujimoto, T.,  Product Development Performance: Strategy, 
Organization, and Management in the World Auto Industry, 1991, Harvard Business 
School Press. 
 
Crawford, V. P., and Sobel, J., “Strategic Information Transmission,” Econometrica, 
1982, 50(6), pp.1431-1451. 
   42 
Egawa ,M., Reinhardt, F., and Yao, D., Toyota Motor Corp: Launching Prius, 2006,  
Harvard Business School Case #9-706-458. 
 
Foss, N. J., “Selective Intervention and Internal Hybrids: Interpreting and Learning from 
the Rise and Decline of the Oticon Spaghetti Organization,” Organization Science, 2003,   
14(3), pp.331-349. 
 
Freeland, R. F., “The Myth of the M-Form? Governance, Consent, and Organizational 
Change,” American Journal of Sociology, 1996, 102(2), pp.483-526. 
 
Fujimoto, T.,  Evolutional Theory of Production System:  Toyota's Organizational 
Capability and Creation Process, 1997, Yuhikaku Publishing.(in Japanese) 
 
Garicano and Van Zandt.”Hierarchies and the Division of Labor. Chapter for the 
Handbook of Organizational Economics    Gibbons.R and Roberts.J (eds.),”  (year),  
Princeton University Press. 
 
Gibbons, R., Game Theory for Applied Economists, 1992, Princeton University Press. 
 
Henderson, R. M., and Clark, K. B., “Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of 
Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firm,”  Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 1990, 35(1), pp.9-30.   
 
Iemura,H.,  Prius, a Dream: Door of the 21st Century opened by Toyota, 1999,  
Futabasha.(in Japanese) 
 
Ikari,Y., The Era of Hybrid Cars; World's First Mass-produced Hybrid Cars; Toyota's 
Development Story of the Prius, 1999, Kojinsha.(in Japanese) 
 
Itazaki,E., .Innovative Toyota Motor - World-shaking Prius Shock, 1999, Nikkan Kogyo 
Shinbun.(in Japanese)     43 
Jeffrey, K. L.,The Toyota Way: 14 Management Principles from the World's Greatest 
Manufacturer, 2004, McGraw-Hill. 
 
Niihara,H., Research on Well Performing Companies in Japan, Nikkei. ( In Japanese). 
 
Radner, R., “The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing,” Econometrica, 
1993, 61(5), pp.1109-1146. 
 
Rantakari, H.,  “Governing Adaptation,”    Review of Economic Studies,  2008,  75(4), 
pp.1257-1285. 
 
Sloan, A., My Years with General Motors, 1990, Broadway Business. 
 
Tsukamoto,K.,  Why Hollywood Stars Drive the Prius? Unknown Toyota's World 
Strategy, 2006, The Asahi Shinbun. (in Japanese)   
 
Uchiyamada,T.,  Interview with Kinbara, Yoshiro held on Dec. 17, 2003; Engineers 
should think themselves and seek the best, 2003,   
http://www.jsae.or.jp/
~dat1/interview040413.pdf  ( In Japanese). 
 
Zandt, T. V., Real-Time Hierarchical Resource Allocation with Quadratic Costs, 2003,  
mimeo. 
 